In this study, we examine the determinants of firms' IPO decisions in Taiwan, for the sample period of 1989 to 2000. The regulations in Taiwan permit us to identify firms that met IPO requirements but chose not to go public. The unique regulatory environment allows a clear comparison of firms that choose IPOs and those that do not. With the exception of Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998), we are not aware of any similar study. Their paper examines the IPO market in Italy, and there seem to be considerable differences between that market and Taiwan market. Indeed, we find strong evidence that IPOs are not motivated by financing needs or constraints while they do. Some of our results are nevertheless consistent with theirs --in particular, we find that larger and profitable firms are more likely to list equity. Our other findings also provide support for, though not overwhelmingly, information asymmetry, listing costs, liquidity, owners' diversification desire, and market timing as factors influencing IPO decisions. Finally, we present evidence strongly consistent with venture capital providing certification to firm credibility.
New Results Using Data from Taiwan Introduction
Research in initial public offerings (IPOs) is vast and has been growing at a faster pace in recent years (Varshney and Robinson (2004) ). However, the research has been mostly concentrated on post-IPO performances and markets. Moreover, as Ritter and Welch (2002) state "For the most part, formal theories of IPO issuing activity are difficult to test. This is because researchers usually only observe the set of firms actually going public. They do not observe how many private firms could have gone public." One notable exception is Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998, hereinafter PPZ) that studies IPOs in Italy.
1 Their study indicates that IPOs are relatively infrequent events in Italyonly 69 firms conducted IPOs in their sample period of 1982 to 1992, which is just a fraction of over 10,000 public companies in that country. Moreover, the breath of the IPO market is fairly low; firms that undertook IPOs typically are well-established, large firms;
and venture capital is inactive in the Italian market. In contrast, the IPO market in the US is characterized by high liquidity, abundance of small firms and growth-oriented firms, and active participation by venture capitalists. The IPO markets in some Asian countries exhibit characteristics that are more similar to the US market than to the Italian market.
For instance, the venture capital market is fairly active in Taiwan, which is not surprising in that many executives, scientists, and entrepreneurs are familiar with the US market and, in many cases, trained in the US. 2 More important to our study, pre-issue data is available for most firms in Taiwan owing to regulations. Specifically, the government requires all firms that exceed a minimum asset size to file financial statements with the SEC there, even if their shares are not publicly traded.
In order to make our results comparable to those in PPZ (1998), we use a methodology that closely follows theirs. Moreover, we have additional data unavailable in their study. Consequently, we extend their study by including venture capital involvement, free cash flows, and R&D expenditures in the analysis.
We find some differences between results of PPZ (1998) and ours. Consistent with their evidence, we show that the probability of going public is greater for larger and profitable firms. Unlike theirs, we do not find strong evidence that firms in industries with higher industry market-to-book ratios are prone to issue new shares. In fact, for firms that are not in the electronics industry, the tendency is the opposite. PPZ (1998) also conclude that the primary motive for firms to raise fund through public offering is restructure of financing or a reduction of the outstanding debt. Our results, on the other hand, imply that financing need is not a strong motive for IPO. We also find evidence that the involvement of venture capital raises the likelihood of going IPO. where IPO i,t is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one for i'th firm that goes IPO in year t; SALES is the log of sales a year before; CAPEX represents the rate of increase in fixed assets; R&D is computed as R&D expense over total assets; ROA is EBIT 3 For Example in 1995, the primary listing standards for Taiwan Stock Exchange are: capital is in excess of NT$0.2 billion (roughly $6 million using current exchange rate), pre-tax return on capital has been at least 5% for two consecutive years, number of shareholders is at least 2,000, and that equity ratio is over 1/3. The OTC requirements are less demanding and have no restrictions on equity ratios. 4 PPZ (1998) perform separate analyses of carve-outs and independent companies. We do not do that here, since carve-outs are very few in Taiwan. divided by total assets; ; D/A represents the debt-to-asset ratio; INT measures effective interest rate, estimated by interest plus amortization expenses divided by the outstanding debt amount; M/B is the industry median market-to-book ratio; GROWTH is sales growth rate; FCF is free cash flow, calculated as income before interest, tax, and depreciation minus interest and dividends, normalized by total assets; and VC is a dummy variable that equals one if venture capital is involved and zero otherwise. As in PPZ (1998), a variable the represents the year when IPO is conducted is added to the regression but not reported.
Sample, Methodology and Hypotheses
The hypothesized signs of these variables are discussed by PPZ (1998) and summarized in and less free cash flow. To the extent that these two variables are good proxies for riskiness, the expected signs for coefficients of INT and FCF are positive and negative, respectively. The coefficient of free cash flow, FCF, also is predicted to be negative if firms prefer to use internally generated capital and would use external funds only if they cannot produce sufficient cash flows. In addition, high cash flows might be a symptom of agency problems thus a lower propensity for IPO. Megginson and Weiss (1991) , Gompers (1995) and Lerner (1995) suggest that venture capitalists provide a certification function; if so, the engagement of venture capital likely raises the probability of listing.
Therefore, we hypothesize that the coefficient of VC is positive. Consistent with the results in PPZ (1998), the correlation with IPO of either SIZE or ROA is positive. The positive sign of SIZE coefficient is in agreement with information asymmetry, listing costs, and liquidity being relevant factors for initial owners. In contrast to their study where M/B was found to be a major determinant, we find M/B is significantly positively related to IPO only for the entire sample but not for industries outside electronics. In fact, in the regression that excludes the industry of electronics, the coefficient of M/B is negative though statistically insignificant. Thus the evidence in favor of market-timing ability is rather weak.
Empirical Results
Perhaps our most striking result is that many coefficients are contrary to the notion that IPO arises from the need for financing or as an attempt to seek alternative financing sources. We reach this conclusion by the observations described below. listing. Taken together, they imply that the greater the expenditure, the lower the probability of IPO. Therefore, we interpret that the overall evidence against IPO being motivated by financing need and/or constraint is fairly strong.
The table also shows that the probability of IPO is positively related to R&D expenditure. As stated earlier, this is inconsistent with confidentially being a major factor. We feel that to a large extent that this result can be explained by the fact that electronic industry, as a whole, tends to have greater R&D and tend to favor IPOs. Stated differently, the result here may be a reflection of higher probability for an electronic firm to seek listing. When we examine only the electronic industry, this coefficient becomes insignificant, which might be due to the lack of variations in R&D expenditures in this industry -it is plausible that competition among electronic firms is so intense that most firms consider R&D necessary and unavoidable activities.
The negative sign of D/A is clearly a piece of evidence against IPO as a solution for financial restructure. The trouble with this result is that no existing theory seems to be capable of explaining the negative sign. A possible explanation is that firms with high debt may be firms with financial difficulties and/or considerable information asymmetry, thus they are unlikely to meet the listing requirements. Another reason for this result is TSE's requirement that equity must be at least 1/3 of assets, which would deny firms with high debt ratios. However, the OTC market imposes no such requirement and yet the result is qualitatively the same.
There is some evidence supporting IPO as a means for initial owners to diversify.
Specifically, lower amount of cash flow implies a riskier firm thus greater probability of IPO, which is confirmed by the negative coefficient on FCF. On the other hand, the coefficient of INT is not unambiguously positive, as would be expected if diversification is an important driving force.
The result on venture capital is uniformly positive using any sample. This is consistent with venture capital serving as a certification agent. The participation by venture capital likely enhances managerial efficiency and transparency thus promoting investor confidence and the likelihood of going public.
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Conclusions
In this study, we examine the determinants of firms' IPO decisions in Taiwan Their paper examines the IPO market in Italy, and there seem to be considerable differences between that market and Taiwan market. Indeed, we find strong evidence that results are nevertheless consistent with theirs --in particular, we find that larger and profitable firms are more likely to list equity. Our other findings also provide support for, though not overwhelmingly, information asymmetry, listing costs, liquidity, owners' diversification desire, and market timing as factors influencing IPO decisions. Finally, we present evidence strongly consistent with venture capital providing certification to firm credibility. The results using the Taiwan market may be more relevant to US investors, since in many aspects this market is more similar to the US than to the Italian market where IPOs are infrequent events and venture capital is inactive. Note: sales are shown as the log of amount in NT$1,000
Note: The means of R&D and ROA are significantly different at 1% between IPO and non-IPO firms and the means of SALES and D/A are significantly different at 5%, according to the t test. Table 2 Probit Analysis of the probability of going IPO
The numbers represent coefficients in the regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. The signs ***, **, and * indicate significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. -1378.267 -457.267 -870.714 -1025.393 -391.848 -592.070 -1035.417 -446.753 -520.401 
